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Social Philosophy & Policy 25:1 (Winter 2008):
Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Relativism in Ethics
-Philip Pettit, "Substantive Moral Theory"
-Christopher W. Gowans, "Virtue and Nature"
-Douglas B. Rasmussen, "The Importance of Metaphysical Realism for Ethical Knowledge"
-Tibor R. Machan, "Why Moral Judgments Can Be Objective"
-Tara Smith, "The Importance of the Subject in Objective Morality: Distinguishing Objective from Intrinsic Value"
-Darryl F. Wright, "Evaluative Concepts and Objective Values: Rand on Moral Objectivity"
-Mark LeBar, "Aristotelian Constructivism"
-Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Moral Construction as a Task: Sources and Limits"
-David B. Wong, "Constructing Normative Objectivity in Ethics"
-Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons, "What Does Moral Phenomenology Tell Us about Moral Objectivity?"
-Julia Driver, "Imaginative Resistance and Psychological Necessity"
-Connie S. Rosati, "Objectivism and Relational Good"
-Scott MacDonald, "Foundations in Aquinas's Ethics"
-Michael Huemer, "Revisionary Intuitionism"
-Nicholas Rescher, "Moral Objectivity"
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